Immediately following the arrests Premier Getty phoned and asked for a meeting to try and work out the differences between the Lubicon people and the Alberta Provincial Government. We refused to meet until our people were released from jail. The 27 people were then released from jail late that same night and the next day we spoke with Premier Getty again, this time agreeing to meet on October 22nd at a mutually agreed "neutral site". The "neutral site" selected for the October 22nd meeting was a little northern Alberta town called Grimshaw. Our meeting with Premier Getty on October 22nd has since been called the "Grimshaw Summit". On October 22nd we hammered out an agreement with Premier Getty which provided for the Provincial Government to transfer 79 square miles of land to the Federal Government for purposes of establishing a Lubicon reserve, plus to "sell" the Federal Government another 16 square miles "for use by the Lubicon Band". The 79 square miles included full surface and sub-surface rights, as do all other Indian reserves in Alberta. The 16 square miles included only surface rights but our agreement with Premier Getty provided that no development activity could occur on this 16 square mile area without Lubicon consent. Taken together the two pieces of land totalled 95 square miles of reserve land, or about 128 acres per Lubicon. One hundred and twenty eight acres per person is the amount of reserve land which the Indians who signed Treaty in the surrounding area were allowed to retain. The reason for the distinction between the 79 and 16 square mile areas was that the Provincial Government was only prepared to admit to an obligation of 79 square miles, but agreed to "sell" the other 16 square miles in order to make the deal. Such arrangements had been made before with other aboriginal people; however, for such arrangements to serve the intended purpose, the 16 square mile area had also to be formally established as tax-free, inalienable reserve land under Federal Government jurisdiction. Otherwise the 16 square mile area would be subject to expropriation and/or might in other ways be lost to future generations of Lubicon people. The status of the 16 square mile area, we agreed with Premier Getty, would have to be worked out with the Federal Government. Another provision of the agreement negotiated with Premier Getty on October 22nd was that the Federal Government "will be responsible for the compensation of all third party interests, surface and sub-surface, within the 79 square mile area...(as well as)...for the compensation of all third party surface interests within the 16 square mile area". Needless to say this was a provision in the agreement which would have to be worked out between the two levels of Canadian Government. There was no known precedent of such compensation being paid by the Federal Government. However the idea of such compensation originally came from Federal Inquiry Officer E. Davie Fulton, who recommended that the Federal Government compensate the Province for the value of any land over and above the 25.4 square miles set aside in 1939, because, Mr. Fulton said, "It's entirely the fault of Canada that the matter was not disposed of (at that time)". Our October 22nd agreement with Premier Getty of course didn't settle Lubicon land rights. Not only were there a number of other remaining issues to be resolved between the Lubicon people and both levels of Canadian Government, the Federal Government is the only level of Government in Canada Constitutionally able to negotiate a settlement of aboriginal land rights. What our agreement with Premier Getty did do, however, was clearly take the Alberta Government out of the key membership debate, thus squarely placing primary responsibility for settlement or lack of settlement on the Federal Government. From this point onward the Federal Government could no longer claim that the Provincial Government was blocking settlement over the membership issue. A few days later Mr. McKnight spelled out his first reactions to what he called "The Lubicon Lake Agreement-In-Principle". He said that he was prepared to accept and start servicing the 79 square mile area just as soon as the land was transferred by the Provincial Government; however, he said, he was still only prepared to provide services to those people he considered to be Indians. While he refused to say how many Lubicon people he considered to be Indians, one of his officials told reporters that the Federal Government was prepared to recognize only about 235 out of a total of approximately 500 Lubicon people. In other words, irrespective of the question of reserve land size, which had been basically solved by the Grimshaw Agreement, Mr. McKnight was still insisting on applying unilaterally determined Federal Government membership criteria which would have the effect of splitting our society and tearing our families asunder. Reiterating the position taken by Mr. Tasse a couple of years earlier, Mr. McKnight claimed that C-31 revisions to the Indian Act allowed the Lubicon people to put whomever they pleased on their membership list, but, he said, the Federal Government could not provide services to people "who are not Indian". To illustrate his point Mr. McKnight told one reporter that we could put Lennarson and O'Reilly on our membership list. He told another reporter that we could put "you and me on their membership list". These public statements by Mr. McKnight were not only demonstrably untrue, they were deliberately deceitful. Lubicon membership criteria, agreed in writing by Mr. McKnight's predecessor and well known by Federal officials, are basically fourfold. All of our people are people of aboriginal ancestry ordinarily resident in our traditional area and linked by family and historic ties. This is the way we've always determined our membership. One only has to contemplate the significance of these four criteria to appreciate not only who does and doesn't qualify as a Lubicon, but also to understand the implications of splitting a people so defined into at least two distinct groups with completely different rights and responsibilities. Explaining to reporters that the Federal Government's position on membership wasn't as big a deal as we were making it out to be, professional Federal Government propagandist Colby told reporters, "I think that membership is an issue that really doesn't count for much". He said, "You aren't going to have a policeman behind every (on-reserve) water tap to make sure that nobody who isn't a status Indian drinks a glass of water". However, he admitted, whether all of the Lubicon people would qualify for key programs and services like housing, education and medical benefits is "a more difficult problem". Regarding the 16 square mile area which the Alberta Government was prepared to sell to the Federal Government "for use by the Lubicon Band", Mr. McKnight said, "The 16 square mile parcel outside the reserve will also need a little work". He said that the Federal Government "cannot accept or hold lands except as a reserve". And he proposed that the Lubicon people could "perhaps...establish a corporation, with the Province giving the lands to the corporation in much the same way as Canada gave the lands to the Province". Again Mr. McKnight was being deliberately deceptive and deceitful. He knew full well that there was absolutely no intention on our part or Mr. Getty's part for the 16 square mile area to be "outside the reserve". He knew full well that the Federal Government had the power to formally establish the 16 square mile area as part of the Lubicon reserve. And he knew full well that neither level of Canadian Government would ever agree to transferring the 16 square mile area from Provincial to Lubicon jurisdiction "in much the same way as Canada gave the lands to the Province". What Mr. McKnight was really saying that he didn't like the Grimshaw deal, didn't like the idea of conceding a 79 square mile reserve, and was flatly refusing to agree to a 95 square mile reserve. He was therefore taking the position that the Lubicon people could "own" the 16 square mile area like any other private land owner under Provincial Government jurisdiction, subject to Provincial Government taxes, alienation, expropriation, etc. On November 1, 1988--two days before Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was scheduled to make a campaign appearance in Alberta where Lubicon supporters were known to be planning major demonstrations--we received the by now expected contact from representatives of the Federal Government. A Federal Indian Affairs official by the name of Jobin contacted Lubicon advisor Lennarson and told Lennarson that he'd been asked to hand-deliver a letter from Mr. Malone. The Malone letter asked about the possibility of talks regarding provisions of the Grimshaw Agreement. It soon became clear, however, that Jobin had been asked to do more than simply hand-deliver a letter from Malone. Jobin asked Lennarson how many Lubicon people could be registered as Indians under the C-31 revisions to the Federal Indian Act. Lennarson told Jobin that it didn't matter because the Lubicon people intended to determine their own membership in any case--as had all other aboriginal people who'd made treaty with the Canadian Government. Jobin told Lennarson that Federal officials figured all but 20 or 30 of our people could be registered as Indians under the revised Indian Act and that "the rest can be accommodated somehow". Lennarson told Jobin that the Indian Act wasn't relevant until at least after a treaty or adhesion to treaty had been negotiated between the Lubicon people and the Canadian Government. Jobin said that the Federal Government was prepared to negotiate an adhesion to Treaty 8 but that agreement still had to be reached as to which criteria would be used to determine membership. Lennarson suggested that the Federal Government simply agree to use the same membership criteria as those used a couple of months earlier in an "agreement-in-principle" signed between the Federal Government and the Dene/Metis of the Northwest Territories; namely, Canadian citizenship, lineal descent, residency and community acceptance. Lennarson said all of the Lubicon people qualified by definition under the first three of those criteria, leaving only the criteria of "community acceptance", or, in other words, Lubicon determination of Lubicon membership. Jobin said that the people in the NWT retained unextinguished aboriginal land rights while the Lubicon people only had an unfulfilled land entitlement under Treaty 8. Lennarson told Jobin that Jobin knew better. Lennarson also pointed out that Jobin had only a moment before indicated that the Federal Government was prepared to negotiate an adhesion to Treaty 8--which obviously didn't make sense with someone supposedly already a party to Treaty 8. "Whether or not the Lubicon people signed treaty", Jobin said, "northern Alberta is covered by Treaty 8". Lennarson pointed out to Jobin that the NWT was covered by Treaties 8 and 11. He said that the Federal Government was still negotiating aboriginal land rights with the people in the NWT, according to the words of a recent Federal Government press release, "in order to maintain equality of treatment among northern natives (who'd signed and hadn't signed treaty), and because the land entitlement under the treaties was virtually unfulfilled". He reminded Jobin that the Lubicon people hadn't signed treaty and didn't have recognized reserve lands. Jobin told Lennarson that Federal officials were worried about non- status and Metis people from across the country demanding Federal Government programs and services if the Federal Government agreed to allow the Lubicon people to determine their own membership. Lennarson told Jobin that each case would have to assessed on its own merits--that people either had rights or they didn't. He pointed out that the Metis of the NWT were included in the proposed NWT settlement and that nobody seemed particularly concerned about precedent. Moreover, Lennarson told Jobin, they both knew that it wasn't a question of precedent in any case, since it was clear neither level of Canadian Government had any respect for precedent or the rule of law. He said that aboriginal people in Canada without the power to enforce respect for their rights wouldn't be helped by precedent. He said that aboriginal people in Canada with the power to enforce respect for their rights would establish their own precedent. Jobin said that he was sure it would be possible to settle if only there could be talks between the Federal Government and the Lubicon people. Lennarson told Jobin that McKnight would have to stop insisting on splitting the Lubicon people as a pre-condition to talks. Jobin asked how the Lubicon people wanted "to handle the 16 square miles". Lennarson told Jobin that the 16 square miles would have to formally established as tax free, inalienable reserve lands under Federal jurisdiction--as had been done in other cases. Jobin asked Lennarson if the Lubicon people were prepared to compromise on any of the outstanding issues. Lennarson told Jobin that the Lubicon people were prepared to compromise on money issues, but that we were not prepared to compromise members of our families, or the principle of equal treatment. Jobin asked if the Lubicon people were waiting to see who won the Federal election before agreeing to talk. Lennarson told Jobin that we were prepared to talk with any Federal Government sincerely interested in settling our aboriginal land rights rather than trying to outsmart, outmanoeuvre and outlast us. On November 2nd Mr. Lennarson responded to Mr. Malone's letter of November 1st, telling Mr. Malone that we were prepared to discuss the Grimshaw Agreement but wanted first to resolve the key issue of membership. Malone said "We think that we should start with the joint (Lubicon/Provincial land) proposal and see if we can solve it". Lennarson told Malone that we considered membership to be the key issue with the Federal Government at the moment and weren't prepared to discuss other issues until we'd solved membership. The following morning we received a phone call from Mr. Mulroney asking for a meeting when he was in Edmonton that coming evening. Asked if Mr. Mulroney's intervention represented a slight to Mr. McKnight, professional Federal Government propagandist Colby said: "No, I don't think he's pulling rank at all. The Lubicons have been assembling a fairly impressive demonstration for Edmonton tonight. They've been bussing Indians in from all over Western Canada. I think the Prime Minister felt that it would be a reasonable thing to do". During our meeting Mr. Mulroney mentioned with pride the Dene/Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement-In-Principle which he'd personally signed only a couple of months before. We told him that our long- standing disagreement over the membership issue would be immediately solved if the Federal Government used the same approach to membership in our case as with the Dene/Metis. Mr. Mulroney declined to discuss matters of substance, indicating that he would prefer to talk about a way to get negotiations started. In this regard, he said, he was prepared to have his personal Chief of Staff, a man named Derek Burney, "expedite settlement of the Lubicon dispute". Mr. Burney was described as Mr. Mulroney's "top problem solver". We hoped that the problem which Mr. Mulroney had asked Mr. Burney to solve was the problem of unresolved Lubicon land rights, instead of only the problem of political embarrassment during the Federal election. In retrospect it's clear that Mr. Mulroney had no intention of negotiating a fair and equitable settlement of Lubicon land rights, and that he had something far more sinister in mind than just avoiding politically embarrassing encounters along the campaign trail. It's now clear that Mr. Mulroney's real objective from the very beginning was to use the pretence of serious negotiations as part of a deliberate and concerted effort to try and publicly discredit the Lubicon people, not because of the legal precedent which an equitable Lubicon settlement would establish for other aboriginal people in Canada with unrecognized rights--which doesn't concern a Federal Government with no respect for the rule of law in any case--but because of the political example we were setting for other aboriginal people in Canada struggling for recognition of their rights, and also because of the international attention which we were drawing to the plight of aboriginal people in Canada. A week after our meeting with Mr. Mulroney, on November 8th, we received a phone call from Mr. Burney asking for a meeting between Federal Lubicon negotiator Brian Malone and Lubicon representatives "to clear up any misunderstandings about what the Lubicon people are trying to achieve". We agreed to the proposed meeting but also offered to send Mr. Burney materials on the Lubicon position directly, so that he wouldn't have to rely solely upon Mr. Malone for information on our position. Mr. Burney said that he'd be pleased to receive information on the Lubicon position directly from us. A Lubicon briefing package providing information on all aspects of our position--including compensation and socio-economic development--was sent to Mr. Burney the next day. On November 9th Mr. Malone phoned and asked for "a one-on-one meeting" with Lubicon advisor Lennarson to discuss agenda and schedule for negotiation of Lubicon land rights. Mr. Malone said that he was phoning and asking for the meeting as "the personal representative of Derek Burney". He said that he'd "be reporting back directly to Mr. Burney". (Normally we don't agree to "one-on-one" meetings with representatives of the Federal Government, because they've so often in the past publicly misrepresented what took place at such meetings to serve their own political purposes. This time, however, we instructed Mr. Lennarson to agree to a "one-on-one" meeting with Mr. Malone, so as to not in any way impede or adversely affect the possibility of hopefully productive negotiations with the Federal Government.) The meeting between Messrs. Lennarson and Malone to discuss agenda and schedule for Lubicon land negotiations took place on November 10th. Immediately prior to the scheduled meeting Mr. Lennarson asked colleagues with whom he was working to excuse him so that he could meet with Mr. Malone alone, as Mr. Malone had requested. Mr. Malone, however, arrived for the meeting in the company of professional Federal Government propagandist Colby. Mr. Lennarson objected to Mr. Colby's attendance at the meeting, not only because it was clear from previous experience what Mr. Colby was and did for a living, but because Mr. Malone had specifically requested a "one-on-one" meeting. Mr. Malone responded to Mr. Lennarson's objection by telling Mr. Lennarson that the Lubicon people never allow anyone to tell us who we can bring to meetings. Mr. Lennarson reminded Mr. Malone that Mr. Malone had specifically requested a "one-on-one" meeting and told him that the Lubicon people had more honour and integrity than to bring other people to a meeting which they had specifically asked be a "one-on-one". Ignoring Mr. Lennarson's explicit objection to Mr. Colby attending the meeting, Mr. Malone said that he wanted to discuss negotiation agenda and schedule, and that he also "needed" copies of the current Lubicon membership list and self-government paper. Rather than refusing to meet Mr. Malone with Mr. Colby in attendance, and perhaps delaying commencement of hopefully productive negotiations between the Lubicon people and the Government of Canada, Mr. Lennarson decided to proceed with the meeting. In retrospect we would have been wiser to set the tone of our talks with Federal representatives by insisting that they start honouring their agreements. Mr. Lennarson told Mr. Malone that the Lubicon self-government paper requested by Mr. Malone had been tabled with Federal officials during the Fulton Inquiry. He said that Mr. Fulton had reviewed the Lubicon self-government paper at some length in the Fulton Discussion Paper. He suggested that Mr. Malone might do well to take the time to at least read the Fulton Discussion Paper and supporting documentation. He then agreed to provide Mr. Malone with the requested materials and to discuss agenda and schedule for proposed Lubicon land negotiations. The agenda mutually agreed between Messrs. Lennarson and Malone during their meeting on November 10th was as follows: 1.) membership; 2.) the signing of an adhesion to Treaty 8; 3.) reserve status for the 16 square mile area where the Province will be retaining sub-surface rights; 4.) reserve set-up costs including roads; housing; water; sewer; electrification; gasification; communications; a Band office; a school; garbage disposal facilities; community machinery and equipment; a facility to store and maintain community machinery and equipment; a health clinic; a combination court house, fire hall, police station and lock- up; a combination old peoples home and day care facility; a community hall and a community recreation centre (indoor iceskating arena); 5.) socio-economic development including the clearing and breaking of reserve land for reserve purposes, fencing, livestock, agricultural equipment and machinery, a large animal veterinary clinic, a slaughter house, a saskatoon berry farm, a wild rice project, a community store, a vocational training centre, development of an on-reserve gravel pit and gravel crushing operation, a portable concrete batch plant, bridge capital to support creation of independent entrepreneurial enterprises and a Trapper's Support Program; 6.) funding for on-going programs and services; 7.) Lubicon self-government; 8.) compensation and costs. Regarding schedule for the proposed negotiations, Mr. Malone said that he'd be meeting with Provincial Lubicon negotiator John McCarthy the following Monday. He said that he'd be flying to Ottawa Monday night for meetings with Mr. Burney on Tuesday and Wednesday. He said that he had some unspecified "university commitment" on Thursday. He said that he'd be meeting with oil company lawyers on Friday. He said that the following week would be the week of the Federal election, "when nothing much else will be happening". He said that "Burney will be off at the end of December for Washington (to become the new Canadian Ambassador to the United States) and (Malone) would like (Burney) to see negotiations through". He said, "I'd like to target the week of November 28th or the following week for 5 full days of intense negotiations". He said, "If we can't get it done in 5 days, then I don't think we'll ever get it done". (For all of Mr. Malone's fast, slick, used-car salesman type talk, it didn't escape us that Mr. Malone's proposed negotiation schedule didn't start until safely after the Federal election.) On November 18th Mr. Burney wrote "to confirm...the Federal Government's understanding of the agenda for negotiations as agreed to by Mr. Lennarson and Mr. Malone". Mr. Burney's letter projected a schedule for negotiations from November 29th through December 15th and specifically included compensation as a pre-agreed agenda item but failed to mention either socio-economic development or funding of on-going programs and services. Mr. Burney wrote: "If these discussions are to bear fruit, I think it would be useful for both sides to refrain from any media briefings on substance, either before or during the talks...I would therefore propose instead that, once talks begin, public statements should be limited to those agreed to by both sides at the end of each session." Of course aware that "refraining from any media briefings on substance before the talks" meant that the Lubicon issue would effectively be put on the shelf until after the Federal election, but not wanting to do anything which would adversely affect the possibility of productive negotiations with the Federal Government, on November 21st we responded to Mr. Burney's letter of November 18th, agreeing to Mr. Burney's proposed schedule for negotiations, but pointing out that he'd failed to include the pre-agreed items of socio-economic development and funding for on-going programs and services. Regarding Mr. Burney's proposed "handling" of the media during the proposed talks, we wrote: "Your proposed arrangements on the handling of the media are acceptable, presuming that Ken Colby isn't involved in the discussions as an official representative of the Federal Government. Mr. Colby's only conceivable role in the discussions is that of a paid professional propagandist in the employ of the Federal Government, and his only conceivable contribution would be to generate contrived and inaccurate stories, rumours and statements which our people will then have to spend time and energy countering. IF YOU WANT MR. COLBY TO ATTEND THE DISCUSSIONS, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO OPEN THE DISCUSSIONS TO THE MEDIA, SO THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA WOULD BE ABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY ASSESS MR. COLBY'S CONTINUING DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN (Capitalization added)". On November 22nd, Mr. Burney responded to our letter of November 21st, proposing an amended agenda which still included compensation as an explicit agenda item, but also now including both socio-economic development and funding of on-going programs and services. Regarding our position on Mr. Colby and the "handling" of the media, Mr. Burney wrote: "As far as out respective delegations are concerned I will leave it to you to determine your team and will reserve myself the same privilege for the Federal team...I intend to respect the guidelines proposed in my (November 18th) letter regarding media briefings and would hope that you will do the same." We accepted Mr. Burney's revised agenda for proposed Lubicon land negotiations on November 24th. Regarding his position on the possible involvement of Mr. Colby, we wrote: "Your position on (determining) the composition of our respective negotiating teams is of course also acceptable. We'll be constituting our team of people chosen for their ability to make a positive contribution to achieving settlement and presume that you'll be doing the same". By advising Mr. Burney that the Lubicon negotiating team would be selected for their ability to make a positive contribution to achieving settlement, we were of course telling Mr. Burney, without challenging his obvious right to constitute the Federal negotiating team as he saw fit, that including a professional propagandist with no credentials relevant to negotiating aboriginal land rights would raise serious questions about Federal Government intentions. For an experienced diplomat like Mr. Burney to then jeopardize the success of the negotiations by including Mr. Colby as a member of the Federal Government's negotiating team, as he did, suggested once again that the Federal Government was more interested in seeking political advantage than negotiating an equitable settlement. Lubicon land negotiations therefore commenced on November 29th, under a news blackout insisted upon by the Federal Government, but with the Federal Government's professional propagandist in attendance as a supposed member of the Federal Government's negotiating team. During the entire 6 week duration of those negotiations Mr. Colby made not one single substantive comment. His sole purpose in attending the negotiating sessions, undoubtedly at considerable expense to the Canadian taxpayer, was so that he would be better able to conduct a pre- conceived Federal propaganda campaign once negotiations collapsed. He had deliberately deceitful press materials describing the collapse of negotiations prepared and ready to be released BEFORE Federal officials tabled the final "take-it-or-leave-it" settlement offer which caused negotiations to collapse. He had a deliberately deceitful Federal Government propaganda campaign designed and ready to launch BEFORE Federal officials tabled the final "take-it-or-leave-it" settlement offer which caused negotiations to collapse. And, literally within minutes of the collapse of negotiations, he was issuing prepared press statements on the collapse of negotiations, arranging media interviews on the collapse of negotiations, granting media interviews on the collapse of negotiations, and disseminating the catchy media phrases which he'd designed to distort and discredit Lubicon positions like calling Lubicon settlement objectives a "wish list", describing Lubicon settlement motives as "greed not need", and suggesting that we'd publicly misrepresented our settlement goals and "should come clean".